1. State power to regulate the length of railroad trains is not
curtailed or superseded by § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act
(paragraphs 117) of itself, and in the absence of administrative
implementation by the Interstate Commerce Commission; nor by
provisions of the Safety Appliance Act for brakes on trains; nor by
the provision of § 25 of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act
permitting the Commission to order the installation of train stop
and control devices. Pp.
325 U. S.
765-766.
In enacting legislation within its constitutional authority over
interstate commerce, Congress will not be deemed to have intended
to strike down a state statute designed to protect the health and
safety of the public unless its purpose to do so is clearly
manifested, or unless the state law, in terms or in its practical
administration,
Page 325 U. S. 762
conflicts with the Act of Congress or plainly and palpably
infringes its policy. P.
325 U. S.
766.
2. The Arizona Train Limit Law (Arizona Code Ann., 1939, §
69-119), making it unlawful to operate within the State a passenger
train of more than fourteen cars or a freight train of more than
seventy cars,
held, as applied to interstate trains,
invalid as contravening the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution. Pp.
325 U. S. 763,
325 U.S. 781.
3. The commerce clause, even without the aid of Congressional
legislation, protects against state legislation which is inimical
to the national commerce, and in such cases, where Congress has not
acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is the final
arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.
P.
325 U. S.
769.
4. Although this Court, upon review of a decision of a state
court, may determine for itself the facts upon which an asserted
federal right depends, the crucial findings of the state court here
are not challenged in material particulars, are supported by
evidence, and supply an adequate basis for decision of the
constitutional issue presented. P.
325 U. S.
771.
5. The state regulation here involved, admittedly obstructive to
interstate train operation, and having a seriously adverse effect
on transportation efficiency and economy, passes beyond what is
plainly essential for safety, since it does not appear that it will
lessen, rather than increase, the danger of accident. Examination
of all relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest here
asserted is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an
adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service.
P.
325 U.S. 781.
6. The relative weights of the state and national interests
involved are not such as to make inapplicable the rule, generally
observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom
from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation
are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from state
interference. Pp.
325 U.S.
770,
325 U.S.
781.
7. The "full train crew" cases and
South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
distinguished. P.
325 U. S.
782.
61 Ariz. 66, 145 P.2d 530, reversed.
APPEAL from a judgment upholding the constitutionality of the
Arizona Train Limit Law.
Page 325 U. S. 763
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Arizona Train Limit Law of May 16, 1912, Arizona Code Ann.,
1039, § 69-119, makes it unlawful for any person or corporation to
operate within the state a railroad train of more than fourteen
passenger or seventy freight cars, and authorizes the state to
recover a money penalty for each violation of the Act. The
questions for decision are whether Congress has, by legislative
enactment, restricted the power of the states to regulate the
length of interstate trains as a safety measure and, if not,
whether the statute contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution.
In 1940, the State of Arizona brought suit in the Arizona
Superior Court against appellant, the Southern Pacific Company, to
recover the statutory penalties for operating within the state two
interstate trains, one a passenger train of more than fourteen cars
and one a freight train of more than seventy cars. Appellant
answered, admitting the train operations but defended on the ground
that the statute offends against the commerce clause and the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conflicts with
federal legislation. After an extended trial
Page 325 U. S. 764
without a jury, the court made detailed findings of fact, on the
basis of which it gave judgment for the railroad company. The
Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, and directed judgment for the
state. 61 Ariz. 66, 145 P.2d 530. The case comes here on appeal
under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, appellant raising by its
assignments of error the questions presented here for decision.
The Supreme Court left undisturbed the findings of the trial
court, and made no new findings. It held that the power of the
state to regulate the length of interstate trains had not been
restricted by Congressional action. It sustained the Act as a
safety measure to reduce the number of accidents attributed to the
operation of trains of more than the statutory maximum length,
enacted by the state legislature in the exercise of its "police
power." This power the court held extended to the regulation of the
operations of interstate commerce in the interests of local health,
safety and wellbeing. It thought that a state statute, enacted in
the exercise of the police power and bearing some reasonable
relation to the health, safety and wellbeing of the people of the
state, of which the state legislature is the judge, was not to be
judicially overturned notwithstanding its admittedly adverse effect
on the operation of interstate trains.
Purporting to act under § 1, paragraphs 117 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended (49 U.S.C. § 1
et
seq.), the Interstate Commerce Commission, as of September 15,
1942, promulgated as an emergency measure Service Order No. 85, 7
Fed.Reg. 7258, suspending the operation of state train limit laws
for the duration of the war, and denied an application to set aside
the order.
In the Matter of Service Order No. 8, 256
I.C.C. 523. Paragraph 15 of § 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act
empowers the Commission, when it is "of opinion that shortage of
equipment, congestion of traffic, or other emergency requiring
immediate action exists in any
Page 325 U. S. 765
section of the country," to make or suspend rules and practices
"with respect to car service," which includes by paragraph 10 of §
1 "the use, control, supply, movement, distribution, exchange,
interchange, and return" of locomotives and cars, and the "supply
of trains." Paragraph 16 of § 1 provides that, when a carrier is
unable properly to transport the traffic offered, the Commission
may make reasonable directions "with respect to the handling,
routing, and movement of the traffic of such carrier and its
distribution over other lines of roads." The authority of the
Commission to make Order No. 85 is currently under attack in
Johnston v. United States, Civil Action No. 1408, pending
in the Western District of Oklahoma.
The Commission's order was not in effect in 1940, when the
present suit was brought for violations of the state law in that
year, and the Commission's order is inapplicable to the train
operations here charged as violations. Hence, the question here is
not of the effect of the Commission's order, which we assume for
purposes of decision to be valid, but whether the grant of power to
the Commission operated to supersede the state act before the
Commission's order. We are of opinion that, in the absence of
administrative implementation by the Commission, § 1 does not, of
itself, curtail state power to regulate train lengths. The
provisions under which the Commission purported to act, phrased in
broad and general language, do not, in terms, deal with that
subject. We do not gain either from their words or from the
legislative history any hint that Congress, in enacting them,
intended, apart from Commission action, to supersede state laws
regulating train lengths. We can hardly suppose that Congress,
merely by conferring authority on the Commission to regulate car
service in an "emergency," intended to restrict the exercise,
otherwise lawful, of state power to regulate train lengths before
the Commission finds an "emergency" to exist.
Page 325 U. S. 766
Congress, in enacting legislation within its constitutional
authority over interstate commerce, will not be deemed to have
intended to strike down a state statute designed to protect the
health and safety of the public unless its purpose to do so is
clearly manifested,
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.
S. 137,
187 U. S. 148;
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U.
S. 61,
211 U. S. 621,
et seq.; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris,
234 U. S. 412,
234 U. S.
418-419;
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U. S. 79,
306 U. S. 85;
Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U.
S. 740,
315 U. S. 749,
or unless the state law, in terms or in its practical
administration, conflicts with the Act of Congress or plainly and
palpably infringes its policy.
Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227,
63 U. S. 243;
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.
S. 613,
169 U. S. 623;
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S. 533;
Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118,
250 U. S. 122;
Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
283 U. S. 380,
283 U. S. 391;
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441,
301 U. S.
454.
The contention, faintly urged, that the provisions of the Safety
Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 1 and 9, providing for brakes on
trains, and of § 25 of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 26(b), permitting the Commission to order the installation
of train stop and control devices, operate of their own force to
exclude state regulation of train lengths, has even less support.
Congress, although asked to do so, [
Footnote 1] has declined to pass legislation specifically
limiting trains to seventy cars. We are therefore brought to
appellant's principal contention, that the state statute
contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Although the commerce clause conferred on the national
government power to regulate commerce, its possession of the power
does not exclude all state power of regulation. Ever since
Willson v. Black-Bird Creek
Marsh
Page 325 U. S. 767
Co., 2 Pet. 245, and
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been
recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by
Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws
governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some
measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it.
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.
S. 352,
230 U. S.
399-400;
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
303 U. S. 187,
et seq.; California v. Thompson, 313 U.
S. 109,
313 U. S.
113-114, and cases cited;
Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341,
317 U. S.
359-360. Thus, the states may regulate matters which,
because of their number and diversity, may never be adequately
dealt with by Congress.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra,
53 U. S. 319;
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra,
303 U. S. 185;
California v. Thompson, supra, 313 U. S. 113;
Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390,
314 U. S. 394;
Parker v. Brown, supra, 317 U. S. 362,
317 U. S. 363.
When the regulation of matters of local concern is local in
character and effect, and its impact on the national commerce does
not seriously interfere with its operation, and the consequent
incentive to deal with them nationally is slight, such regulation
has been generally held to be within state authority.
South
Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, 303 U. S. 188
and cases cited;
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U.
S. 224,
304 U. S. 238;
Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.
S. 346,
306 U. S. 351;
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598,
309 U. S. 603;
California v. Thompson, supra, 313 U. S.
113-114, and cases cited.
But ever since
Gibbons v.
Ogden. 9 Wheat. 1, the states have not been deemed
to have authority to impede substantially the free flow of commerce
from state to state, or to regulate those phases of the national
commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand
that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.
[
Footnote 2]
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, supra, 53 U. S. 319;
Leisy
Page 325 U. S. 768
v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,
135 U. S. 108,
135 U. S. 109;
Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 230 U. S.
399-400;
Edwards v. California, 314 U.
S. 160,
314 U. S. 176.
Whether or not this long-recognized distribution of power between
the national and the state governments is predicated upon the
implications of the commerce clause itself,
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,
25 U. S. 447;
Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, 230 U. S. 399,
230 U. S. 400;
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.
S. 553,
262 U. S. 596;
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511,
294 U. S. 522;
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra,
303 U. S. 185,
or upon the presumed intention of Congress, where Congress has not
spoken,
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S.
275,
91 U. S. 282;
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485,
95 U. S. 490;
Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622,
114 U. S. 631;
Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 125 U.
S. 465,
125 U. S.
481-2;
Leisy v. Hardin, supra, 135 U. S. 109;
In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545,
140 U. S.
559-560;
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.
S. 289,
153 U. S. 302;
Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.
S. 204,
154 U. S. 212;
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.
S. 466,
306 U. S. 479,
n., Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va.Law Rev. 1,
the result is the same.
In the application of these principles, some enactments may be
found to be plainly within, and others plainly without, state
power. But between these extremes lies the infinite variety of
cases, in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a
regulation of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting
claims of state and
Page 325 U. S. 769
national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and
accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national
interests involved.
Parker v. Brown, supra, 317 U. S. 362;
Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood, 318 U. S.
1,
318 U. S. 8;
see DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S.
34,
273 U. S. 44
(
and compare California v. Thompson, supra);
Illinois
Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.
S. 498,
314 U. S.
504-505.
For a hundred years, it has been accepted constitutional
doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional
legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation
inimical to the national commerce, and that, in such cases, where
Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature,
is, under the commerce clause, the final arbiter of the competing
demands of state and national interests.
Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, supra; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Kaw Valley
District, 233 U. S. 75,
233 U. S. 79;
South Covington R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.
S. 537,
235 U. S. 546;
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Texas, 245 U.
S. 484,
245 U. S. 488;
St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
254 U. S. 535,
254 U. S. 537;
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S.
1,
278 U. S. 10;
Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.
S. 434,
305 U. S. 441;
McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.
S. 176.
Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of
power over interstate commerce. It may either permit the states to
regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be
permissible,
In re Rahrer, supra, 140 U. S.
561-562;
Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky,
238 U. S. 190,
238 U. S. 198;
Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S.
48,
241 U. S. 50,
241 U. S. 51;
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co.,
242 U. S. 311,
242 U. S.
325-326;
Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.
S. 431,
297 U. S.
438-440;
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334,
299 U. S.
350-51;
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,
324 U. S. 652,
324 U. S. 679,
or exclude state regulation even of matters of peculiarly local
concern which nevertheless affect interstate commerce.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v.
Page 325 U. S. 770
United States, 
